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A Behavioral Economics View of Judge Posner’s Contracts 
Legacy 
Deborah R. Gerhardt* 
It is an interesting time to reflect on Judge Richard A. Posner’s legacy and his 
notion of rational decision-making. In 2017, Richard H. Thaler, Judge Posner’s 
colleague at the University of Chicago, won the Nobel Prize in Economics.1 Even 
if Judge Posner is gracious and pleased for his colleague, it must have been tough 
to accept that Thaler won the coveted prize for work that undercuts Judge Posner’s 
brand of traditional law and economics. Judge Posner’s prodigious legacy affirms 
the traditional economic tenet that people and markets behave rationally. Thaler 
won the Nobel Prize for his work establishing quite the opposite: people are 
predictably irrational and consistently behave in ways that defy Judge Posner’s 
brand of economic theory. 
Legal analysis has not sufficiently adjusted by applying behavioral economic 
theory to contract law. This Article contributes to filling that gap by considering 
the following questions. How does the economic analysis of law account for 
irrational behavior? If our choices do not always result from linear, rational 
thinking, should we consider using behavioral economics to rethink our 
understanding of contract law? If we can agree that behavioral economics 
challenges the theoretical coherence of rational economic reasoning, should we 
view behavioral economics as a substitute or adjunct to law and economics? Given 
the explosion of work in behavioral economics that has reshaped our understanding 
of how decisions are made, how can we retrofit Judge Posner’s influence on the 
legal academy? 
Part I briefly describes Posner’s brand of traditional law and economics.  Next, 
it identifies several ways behavioral economics calls his theory into question. Part 
II illustrates how the patterns identified in behavioral economics provide important 
tools for understanding judicial decision-making in contracts cases. Part III 
demonstrates that amoral blind faith in traditional law and economics can provide 
a climate for the growth of markets that are a serious threat to public health and 
safety, such as markets for nondisclosure agreements used to silence victims of 
sexual misconduct. 
 
 * Deborah R. Gerhardt is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law. 
I am grateful to Michael Malloy and my fellow panelists and participants at KCON XIII for this opportunity to 
reflect together on Judge Posner’s legacy. I am also most grateful to Chandler N. Martin and Sara Jane Françoise 
Anderson for excellent research assistance. 
1.  Richard H. Thaler, Prize Lecture: From Cashews to Nudges: The Evolution of Behavioral Economics, 
NOBEL MEDIA (Dec. 8, 2017), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2017/thaler 
-lecture.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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II. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS CHALLENGES POSNER’S ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
RATIONAL DECISION MAKING 
Judge Posner’s work has profound theoretical appeal. His economic view of 
the world is clear and neatly ordered. He believes that if you ask what a rational 
person would choose in a given situation, traditional law and economics provides 
an answer based on utility maximization.2 This disciplined approach gives us 
elegant, straight-forward analytical tools that have been used to modernize and 
streamline legal theory in many disciplines including contracts and intellectual 
property. 
Judge Posner’s writing style makes one want to convert. He writes 
persuasively, with clarity of vision. He illustrates his points with vivid imagery. 
He deftly applies his literary power to brush aside those who challenge his world 
view. He has dismissed the field of behavioral economics as a series of “cognitive 
quirks.”3 Doubt does not burden him. He is brilliant and confident. 
Judge Posner is a man on a mission to prove that his way of thinking is 
superior. In response to the behavioral economics claim that we make decisions 
irrationally, Judge Posner uses multiple rhetorical devices to dismiss the studies he 
does not like. He knows how to take a vivid example from everyday life, and in a 
single sentence, deep-six a competitive theory. To illustrate that we routinely 
dismiss our irrational fears and choose to make rational decisions, Posner points 
out that even if consumers have an irrational fear of flying, we behave rationally 
when buying airline tickets.4 
Another technique he uses is disdain for those who think differently. He 
describes most legal scholarship as “frivolous, even narcissistic.”5 Not so, he says, 
with law and economics, as it illuminates difficult issues in federal cases and 
generates legal reforms that fix them. Join us, he beckons, and you will not be an 
irrelevant navel gazer. You will be among the elite who see clearly. Reach for the 
incisive tools of law and economics, and you will have the power to navigate the 
world persuasively. 
Economic analysis of law explains all human behavior as gathering an optimal 
amount of information and acting to maximize its utility.6 When Judge Posner talks 
about maximizing utility, he means maximizing wealth. Economists famously 
assume that people behave rationally, gather optimal information before making 
decisions, and act to maximize their utility. Even when they acknowledge the 
instances in which these tenets are not literally true, they say that the theory gets 
 
2.  Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN L. REV. 1551, 1559 
(1998). 
3.   Id. at 1553.  
4.  See id. at 1559 n.16.  
5.  RICHARD POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 33 (2016). 
6.  See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976) (“All human 
behavior can be explained to constitute participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences 
and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.”). 
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close enough because it has predictive power. Posner defines rationality as 
“choosing the best means to the chooser’s ends.”7 This view of rationality is not 
about tempering impulses or passions.8 Rather, it is a calculation for the purpose 
of maximizing utility. “It only requires adjusting beliefs to the available evidence 
and acting consistently with your preferences given the constraints and 
opportunities in your situation.”9 That definition is so broad, it can cover any self-
interested choice. If people act rationally when they choose what they prefer, there 
is no limit to what is rational.10 
The enduring legacy of Posner’s traditional law and economics as a predictive 
tool is now in question. Actual human decision-making turns out to be not so neatly 
ordered. A rising tide of behavioral economists are conducting studies showing 
that we often make decisions in predictable ways that are more nuanced and less 
rational than those Judge Posner describes. Behavioral economists have identified 
numerous ways in which we make decisions that do not conform with the rational 
decision-making model championed by Judge Posner. Instead of navigating our 
world as described in classical economic theory, we repeatedly make choices that 
are predictably irrational. In 1998, Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard 
Thaler identified three paradigms for applying behavioral economic principles to 
law. Each illustrates how traditional economics fails to explain actual decision-
making.11 Instead of acting rationally according to the assumptions of traditional 
economic analysis, they showed that people display “bounded rationality, bounded 
will-power, and bounded self-interest.”12 In addition to revealing the limits of 
human rationality, they identify how irrational behavior follows patterns that may 
be modeled to explain and predict specific outcomes. Since then, many studies 
have validated their assertions. 
Each of these patterns reveal important critical perspectives on Judge Posner’s 
analysis of contracts. The first set of behavioral economics heuristics fall under the 
Jolls, Sunstein, and Thaler category of “bounded rationality” and is based on the 
work of Daniel Kahneman. 
A. Bounded Rationality Heuristics 
In 2002, Daniel Kahneman won the Nobel Prize in Economics for his work 
showing that prospect theory is a more accurate description of human behavior 
than utility theory. Prospect theory explores how humans actually deal with risk. 
It posits that when evaluating risk, people do not behave according to the script 
 
7.  Posner, supra note 2, at 1551. 
8.  RUTH W. GRANT, STRINGS ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF INCENTIVES 55 (2012). 
9.  Id. 
10.  See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488 
(1998).  
11.  See id. 
12.  Id. at 1476.  
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written by traditional economists. Instead of making rational choices based on all 
available information, people often use heuristics, which are patterns of discarding 
all information in favor of short-cuts or rules of thumb. The heuristics of 
availability, loss aversion, the endowment effect, and arbitrary coherence have 
particular relevance to contract theory. 
The availability heuristic explains how we process probability and risk. Instead 
of weighing all available information equally, we are biased in favor of what we 
know or have seen before. Our “judgments about probabilities will often be 
affected by how ‘available’ other instances of the harm in question are, that is, on 
how easily such instances come to mind.”13 The availability effect is a processing 
bias that clouds our ability to think rationally and can affect a variety of contracts 
scenarios. It can help explain gap-fillers and objective theory. But if it is ignored, 
it may prejudice anyone seeking to enforce an atypical agreement, especially if an 
experienced jurist has many typical scenarios in his or her memory bank. 
Another prospect theory heuristic relevant to judicial interpretation of 
contracts is that humans attach to what we have in addition to what we know. In a 
series of experiments, Kahneman explained this endowment effect—that people 
place higher value on goods they own than those owned by others. A corollary 
idea, known as loss aversion, is that losses are felt more deeply than gains. Both 
patterns are reflected in an experiment conducted by Dan Ariely, a Professor of 
Psychology and Behavioral Economics at Duke University,14 home of the Blue 
Devils. 
Attending a Duke home basketball game is an unforgettable experience. 
Cameron Indoor Stadium is old and small. When the team does well, the whole 
stadium literally shakes with excitement. A section of seats is reserved for students, 
but the demand for tickets is always higher than the supply. Duke students camp 
out for days to enter a lottery, and some of those who wait in line are randomly 
selected to get tickets. 
Professor Ariely realized that the market for these seats presented an ideal 
laboratory for an experiment on the endowment effect. Ariely selected 100 
students who camped out for tickets to participate in his study. Before waiting in 
line for tickets, all students were similarly situated. They wanted Duke basketball 
tickets enough to camp out overnight for the chance to win the lottery. Half of the 
selected participants had won seats through the lottery; the other half had not. 
Consistent with both loss aversion and the endowment effect, the 50 students with 
tickets had become so attached to the idea of attending the basketball game that, 
on average, they would only agree to sell their seat for $2,400. The 50 students 
who did not have tickets were willing to pay only $170. Ariely explains that we 
“fall in love with what we already have.”15 He continued to expand on our 
 
13.  Id. at 1518. 
14.  See DANIEL ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 
172 (2008) (describing the experiment summarized in the following two paragraphs). 
15.  Id. at 173. 
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understanding of the endowment effect with experiments showing that the more 
we invest in our possessions, the more we feel attached to them. Ariely calls this 
version of the endowment theory the Ikea effect.16 
Another behavioral pattern that reveals insights into human decision-making 
is arbitrary coherence. Traditional economists claim that we seek market 
information to make rational decisions about a fair price before deciding on a 
product’s monetary value. Behavioral economists have demonstrated that our 
sense of value does not work that way at all. Instead, like ducks who imprint on 
their moms, we attach to our initial sense of a product’s value.17 And even more 
disturbing, our beliefs in the fairness of “[i]nitial prices are largely ‘arbitrary’ and 
can be influenced by responses to random questions.”18 In one of Ariely’s studies, 
participants derived their sense of an object’s worth from the last two digits of their 
social security numbers. 
Behavioral economists have also shown we should doubt the traditional law 
and economics assumption that resources gravitate towards their most valuable 
uses. Traditionalists, like Posner, claim that people can be expected to suck the 
total value from all available money.19 Based on this reasoning, when gas prices 
fall, the rational person would use their surplus funds on things other than gas. 
Behavioral economists have shown that this is not actually how people behave. 
People treat a subset of their money as gas money.20 When gas prices fall, a 
surprising number buy premium gas instead of transferring the extra dollars to 
other goods and services.21 
Behavioral economists have revealed and tested fascinating dynamics about 
the nature of costs that differ substantially from those posited by Posner. 
Traditional law and economics thinkers, like Posner, focus on the point of 
purchase. In buying a consumer product or entering a commercial contract, Posner 
says that a forward-thinking, rational choice is made.22 Costs at this moment in 
time are opportunity costs.23 Sunk costs are irrelevant because they do not affect 
the risks, costs, and benefits going forward.24 In fact, behavioral economists have 
demonstrated that sunk costs matter and influence our decisions. Behavioral 
economists have shown that, in addition to having limits on our rational capacities, 
we are also easily tempted by the way information is presented and our sense of 
what is fair. 
 
16.  See id. at 135. 
17.  Id. at 33. 
18.  Id. 
19.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.1 (2007). 
20.  See ARIELY, supra note 14, at 47. 
21.  See id. at 47. 
22.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 6–7 (8th ed. 2007). 
23.  See id. 
24.  See id. 
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B.  Bounded Will-Power 
Behavioral economists contend that our willpower, like our inclination to think 
rationally, is limited in predictable ways. Traditional economists claim that when 
we have relevant information, we will act rationally and not be influenced by the 
manner in which a problem is framed.25 Thaler’s work demonstrates that, in fact, 
we are easily tempted and do not have the willpower that traditional economists 
describe. A vast literature demonstrates that advertisements and descriptions 
impact our behavior. Consumers can be influenced by the way information is 
presented or how we acquire it. We are sometimes myopic. Even something as 
simple as the color of a product, a store, or an advertisement can exert persuasive 
force, without our knowing it.26 One researcher studying the effects of color on 
marketing concluded that “[p]eople make up their minds within 90 seconds of their 
initial interactions with either people or products. About 62–90 percent of the 
assessment is based on colors alone.”27 
Thaler has identified beneficial policy implications that can flow from 
acknowledging these heuristics. He convinced multiple institutions to adopt “opt 
in” defaults for a variety of beneficial programs. Through such real-world 
experiments, Thaler demonstrated that if participation in a savings plan or school 
lunch program is the default, more people participate.28 If institutions acknowledge 
and act on Thaler’s work, our tendency towards inertia may be recruited to work 
towards a preferred outcome. 
C. Bounded Self-Interest 
Another challenge to the law and economics model involves the behavioral 
assertion that people have a moral compass. Economists see the rational decision 
maker as self-interested and motivated by efficiency. Behavioral economists have 
shown that human decision-making is influenced by non-monetary values, such as 
fairness. It turns out that we are willing to sacrifice utility to others who are kind 
and punish those who are unkind, even if we do not benefit from doing so.29 Studies 
documenting this sense of fairness indicate that we have expectations—a kind of 
true north of reference transactions—that define what is fair, and we are inclined 
to stick to these norms even if they do not always maximize our individual utility 
 
25.  See id. 
26.  See, e.g., Hyojin Lee et al., Monochrome Forests and Colorful Trees: The Effect of Black-and-White 
versus Color Imagery on Construal Level, 41 J. OF CONSUMER RES. 1015 (2014); Benjamin H. Detenber et al., 
The Emotional Significance of Color in Television Presentations, 2 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 331 (2000); Gorn et. al, 
Waiting for the Web: How Screen Color Affects Time Perception, 41 J. OF MARKETING RES. 215 (2004) 
(establishing that background color of a website affected perceived loading time). 
27.  Satyendra Singh, Impact of Color on Marketing, 44 MGMT. DECISION 783 (2006).  
28.  Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More TomorrowTM: Using Behavioral Economics to 
Increase Employee Savings, J. POL. ECON. S164, S168–69 (2004). 
29.  See Jolls, supra note 10, at 1494. 
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for a particular transaction. For example, if vendors were driven only to maximize 
utility according to the changing forces of supply and demand, they would charge 
more for umbrellas on stormy days.30 However, studies show that actual store 
owners generally do not raise umbrella prices when it rains.31 Behavioral 
economists explain that we have a reference point—an anchor in our minds of what 
umbrellas should cost—that affects what we are willing to pay, irrespective of the 
weather. That anchor affects what we will think of the vendor who takes advantage 
of our misfortune on a rainy day by raising prices.32 This type of thinking affects 
many markets. It can mean that employers are more likely to lay off some 
employees than cut wages for all of them.33  Fair price anchors are also reflected 
in legislation that prohibits price gouging during hurricanes and other abnormal 
market disruptions.34 This heuristic may also explain resistance to increasing the 
minimum wage. 
III. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND JUDGE POSNER 
The heuristics identified by behavioral economists can advance our 
understanding of judicial decision-making in contracts cases. Even a jurist as 
brilliant as Judge Posner is prone to using the availability heuristic and anchoring 
his understanding of certain issues to his particular reference transactions. Judge 
Posner’s experience reviewing business contracts has given him a frame of 
reference for the typical deal in many situations. When contract language strays 
from his sense of the norm, his irrelevant anchor of what is normal or reasonable 
may exert more persuasive force than the facts admitted into evidence. 
Judge Posner’s decision in Beanstalk Group, Inc. v. AM General 
Corporation35 reflects this concern.36 The case involved a “Representation 
Agreement” in which Beanstalk agreed to promote AM General’s “Hummer” 
brand in exchange for benefits including 35% of “any agreement or arrangement, 
whether in the form of a license or otherwise, granting merchandising or other 
rights in the Property [defined as the Hummer mark].”37 Before the contract’s term 
expired, AM General sold its rights in the Hummer mark to General Motors, which 
did not want to continue working with Beanstalk.38 When AM General refused to 
pay Beanstalk 35% of the proceeds from the sale, Beanstalk sued for breach of 
contract, asserting that AM General’s sale of the Hummer mark was “an agreement 
 
30.  See ARIELY, supra note 14, at 172. 
31.  Id. 
32.  Id. 
33.  Id. 
34. See, e,g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-38 (prohibiting “excessive pricing during states of disaster, states of 
emergency, or abnormal market disruptions”). 
35.  283 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 2002). 
36.  See id. at 859–60. 
37.  Id. at 858. 
38.  Id. at 859. 
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. . . granting merchandising or other rights” in the mark.39 The trial court granted 
AM General’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim.40 
The question on appeal, as in any motion to dismiss, was whether the plaintiff 
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.41 Beanstalk asserted that the 
language in the contract gave it the right to 35% of the proceeds from any 
agreement granting a right in the property and argued that it had evidence that AM 
General shared this understanding of the plain language in the agreement.42 
Specifically, Beanstalk sought to offer evidence that: 
[S]hortly before AM General sold the Hummer business to General 
Motors, AM General asked Beanstalk to modify the contract. In particular, 
AM General sought to expressly exclude certain types of transactions 
relating to the transfer of rights in the trademark, including ‘agreements 
between [AM General] and any individual or entity, for the purpose of 
producing motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts and accessories, even if 
rights in the [trademarks] are licensed, transferred, or otherwise involved 
in such agreements.’43 
This request suggests that both Beanstalk and AM General understood the contract 
to mean that transferring the Hummer trademark triggered an obligation for AM 
General to pay Beanstalk 35% of the deal’s value. 
Agreements that accurately reflect the parties’ intentions are routinely found 
to be valid and enforceable even if they are not particularly well written or turn out 
to be bad deals. Judge Posner rejected the idea that AM General would have signed 
a deal that did not maximize its utility in the way he would have expected. Posner 
called the contract “absurd” and affirmed the lower court’s decision granting AM 
General’s motion to dismiss before Beanstalk could proceed with discovery. 
Posner reasoned that: 
[W]ritten contracts are usually enforced in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the language used in them and without recourse to evidence, 
beyond the contract itself, as to what the parties meant. This presumption 
simplifies the litigation of contract disputes and, more important, protects 
contracting parties against being blindsided by evidence intended to 
contradict the deal that they thought they had graven in stone by using 
clear language. It is a strong presumption, motivated by an understandable 
distrust in the accuracy of litigation to reconstruct contracting parties’ 
intentions, but it is rebuttable—here by two principles 
 
39.  Beanstalk Grp., Inc. v. AM Gen. Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1027 (N.D. Ind. 2001), aff’d, 283 F.3d 
856 (7th Cir. 2002). 
40.  See id. at 1032. 
41.  Beanstalk Grp., Inc., 283 F.3d at 858. 
42.  See id. at 859. 
43.  Id. at 865 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
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of contract interpretation that are closely related in the setting of this suit. 
The first is that a contract will not be interpreted literally if doing so would 
produce absurd results, in the sense of results that the parties, presumed to 
be rational persons pursuing rational ends, are very unlikely to have 
agreed to seek.44 
This decision leaves one wondering why Posner’s assumptions about the 
typical business relationship are so supremely rational that a deviation from what 
is typical becomes “absurd.” After all, it is certainly within the realm of possibility 
that some private parties will strike a deal that is different from those Posner 
generally sees. Posner’s strong allegiance to his idea of the typical trademark 
license agreement (his reference transaction) may have blinded him to the 
possibility that the actual deal in this case was different. Even in the face of clear 
contract language and AM General’s later efforts to renegotiate, Posner refused to 
consider the possibility that the facts might actually be atypical. Posner’s anchor 
became the norm, and Beanstalk was denied its day in court. 
The dissenting judge vented his frustration with Posner’s reasoning, asserting 
that through the opinion the Court: 
[S]ubstitutes its own “cultural understanding,” its own “cultural 
background,” and its own general knowledge of the commercial world for 
a defined term in the contract, a dubious proposition at best. Judges are 
trained in law, not business, and however cosmopolitan we may be about 
the world of commerce, I think it an unwise practice to substitute our 
general knowledge of the business world for the express terms of 
a contract, especially in the absence of any discovery that might elucidate 
the parties’ true intent.45  
When attempting to reconstruct a decision-making scenario based on risk, Posner’s 
thinking conformed to the availability heuristic. He clutched an anchor and would 
not let it go, even in the face of clear language to the contrary. 
Judge Posner is not one to be manipulated—even by his own patterns of 
thinking. Perhaps the best strategy in such a case would be to alert the decision-
maker of our tendency to anchor our sense of what is right to what we have seen 
before, and in doing so, disregard all available information. One could 
acknowledge the availability heuristic and urge Judge Posner to reject it so that his 
subconscious anchors will not lead him to disregard the probative value of all 
available information.46 One could acknowledge that the terms in the agreement at 
issue is not the anchor we normally expect to see in a trademark license or 
 
44.  Id. at 859–60 (majority opinion).  
45.  Id. at 865–66 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
46.  Of course, if Judge Posner is merely maximizing his own utility in making the decision in a way that 
conforms to his reference transaction (instead of looking at the decision-making process of the parties), there may 
not be much room for persuasion.  
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representation agreement. This deal was expressly negotiated to be atypical and 
formalized in a clear written agreement. Despite its failure to conform to what one 
might expect, its terms were negotiated between two sophisticated commercial 
actors, and therefore, one need not apply objective theory or consider what a 
rational party would have written. We know what they wrote. Especially in a 
motion to dismiss, such clear text should not be readily disregarded as “absurd.”47 
Given Judge Posner’s prolific body of work, it would not be difficult to find 
words he wrote that could help distinguish atypical contracts from his reference 
transactions. For example, not many years later, Posner would write: 
Default rules economize on the costs of contracts by saving the parties the 
bother of negotiating a provision that most of them want—the members of 
the minority that does not want such a provision are free to contract around 
it but the majority is saved that bother and expense.48 
In this way, the interplay of traditional and behavioral economics can help 
illuminate our innate biases and improve our contract advocacy and decision-
making. 
IV. THE MARKET FOR SILENCING VICTIMS OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
The prevalence of nondisclosure agreements (“NDAs”) shielding perpetrators 
of sexual misconduct graphically illustrates that there are problems that law and 
economics does not help us solve. Our uncritical belief in markets may have 
contributed to problems in contract doctrine that we would prefer not to have. 
Posner and economic traditionalists have faith that “[i]f voluntary exchanges are 
permitted and the market is allowed to operate, resources will gravitate to their 
most valuable uses.”49 His work is built on the unshakeable foundation that people 
maximize individual utility. For those who think laws can and should delineate 
right from wrong, and that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness should inform 
legal decision-making, Posner’s view of the world can sound shockingly amoral 
and sexist. Given the long wait many have to endure to adopt a child, Posner sees 
“[n]o reason morality should stop us from selling babies.”50 Posner delights in 
applying rational thinking to procreation and sex, pointing out, for example, “that 
noncompanionate marriage is poorly designed for channeling sexual activity into 
marriage.”51  
In twenty-first century America, we must confront whether this type of amoral 
thinking has resulted in some unsavory and dangerous markets, such as the market 
 
47.  Beanstalk Grp., Inc., 283 F.3d at 862. 
48.  In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d 690, 696 (7th Cir. 2011). 
49.  ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 1–2 (1979). 
50.  See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 
323, 345–346 (1978). 
51.  RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 246 (1992). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 50 
359 
for NDAs that hide sexual misconduct. It has become a matter of course for serial 
sex offenders, like Harvey Weinstein and Larry Nassar, to shield their unlawful 
acts from public scrutiny with settlement agreements that require confidentiality.52 
This practice of using private NDAs to hide sexual misconduct has enabled repeat 
offenders to harm victims who may have been able to protect themselves from 
harm if the perpetrators’ past crimes were not shielded from view.53 The well-
established market in NDAs may have maximized the utility of sexual predators.  
And it may have even benefitted some victims who want to recover from their 
painful experience privately. Even though utility between the private parties may 
often be maximized, significant harm may result from permitting perpetrators to 
shield their conduct from future victims.54 Harms to institutions, communities, 
public health, and safety that flow from such markets are complex, systemic, and 
hard to fix. In writing about rape, Judge Posner has given us reason to hope that 
his economic model would support weighing the expense to the community against 
the “utility monster” and his victim.55 
The public outrage over these agreements raise important question that are not 
answered by considerations of criminal conduct alone. Have we permitted a legal 
market for such abuse where the rich and powerful (the Nassars and Weinsteins) 
may freely engage in unlawful misconduct and keep their reputations clean if they 
are willing to pay the victim’s settlement price? If so, should states pass legislation 
stating that NDAs for sexual misconduct violate public policy? Are lawyers who 
repeatedly represent clients in such matters violating ethical obligations?56 
Traditional law and economics theorists do not worry about such questions. 
They believe in their markets. They hold strong to the faith that such transactions 
 
52.  See Des Bieler, Chrissy Teigen Offers to Pay McKayla Maroney’s Fine if She Speaks at Larry Nassar 
Sentencing, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2018/01/16/chrissy-teigen-offers-to-pay-mckayla-maroneys-fine-if-she-speaks-at-larry-nassar-
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will only be banned if it is efficient to do so or favorable to a politically powerful 
interest group.57 Neither reason has inhibited the market for NDAs that hide sexual 
misconduct. If states ban these NDAs with legislation, the new laws will be based 
on a shared moral compass, not efficiency or the protection of the more powerful. 
The public policy justifying these bans would be to protect people who are less 
powerful, like our children, who have no ability to participate in the market or vote 
to elect decision makers who can change it. 
Judge Posner has not yet written about the validity of NDAs hiding sexual 
misconduct, and there is reason to hope that they may provide an interesting 
thought experiment for him to display his prowess for showing that markets can 
solve this problem too. In the context of blackmail, Posner conceded that 
prohibitions against voluntary transactions could be justified if the transactions 
impose involuntary costs on third parties. He wrote that: 
 
[S]ecrecy is entitled to legal protection where it is necessary to protect an 
investment in the acquisition of socially valuable information, but not where 
it serves to conceal facts about an individual, that if known to others, would 
cause them to lower their valuation of him as an employee, borrower, friend, 
spouse, or other transactor.58 
 
Judge Posner could apply this reasoning to support legislation banning NDAs that 
hide sexual misconduct. I wrote to Judge Posner asking to hear his thoughts on this 
matter. So far, months have passed without an answer. 
Meanwhile, some states are taking action. In 2018, the New York legislature 
passed a bill forbidding employers from settling sexual harassment claims with 
agreements that “would prevent the disclosure of the underlying facts and 
circumstances . . . unless the condition of confidentiality is the plaintiff’s choice.”59 
Also in 2018, California enacted legislation stating that an NDA designed to hide 
criminal sexual misconduct or sexual misconduct directed at a minor violates 
public policy, and if entered after January 1, 2017, is void as against public 
policy.60 The statute further provides that lawyers who facilitate such agreements 
may be disciplined for ethical violations.61 Similar legislation is pending in 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey and was introduced as the “EMPOWER” Act in the 
U.S. House and Senate.62 
Behavioral economics provides a sound theoretical explanation for the desire 
to outlaw such agreements. Behavioral economists challenge the traditional law 
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and economics idea that people act with no sense of community, as though we are 
all players in a game where the object is maximizing self-interest. Our desire to 
ban sexual harassment NDAs comes from the human instinct that laws should 
promote fairness. When our laws protect such agreements, have we all become 
complicit in maintaining the perpetrator’s secrecy and hiding his conduct from 
future victims? If we do not want to encourage market forces that hide sexual 
misconduct, we have to articulate a justification for shutting down the market to 
protect children and other victims from future harm. One may claim that shutting 
down such a market maximizes utility.  But the true value goes not to those who 
support the legislation, but to the person who is notified of the bad actor and 
escapes harm. And while we may genuinely share a desire to protect the next child, 
that is not the only force motivating our desire to outlaw NDAs that shield sexual 
misconduct. If our elected representatives enact legislation finding that such 
agreements violate public policy, it will be because they violate our common sense 
of decency. We admire those who defy this market so much that those brave 
enough to face the consequences of violating their NDAs were named Time 
Magazine’s 2017 persons of the year.63 Or to put it as a behavioral economist 
would, our reference transaction for this type of pay-off is that there should be no 
transaction at all. 
In stark contrast to traditional economic analysis, behavioral economics 
provides an explanation and a positive brand for this inclination: fairness 
entrepreneurship.64 For all our many differences in twenty-first century America, 
we still have a cultural moral compass, and these NDAs violate it. Behavioral 
economists have demonstrated that we are not as self-interested as Posner’s work 
describes. We do not run on utility and markets alone. As humans, we use a sense 
of fairness to navigate our lives and make decisions.65 
V. CONCLUSION 
The heavy weight of empirical support for the findings of behavioral 
economics requires rethinking the extent to which law and economics has 
influenced contracts doctrine. Law and economics principles have given us an 
important view of contract law, but it is not the only useful view. In critically 
examining the legacy of law and economics, we must confront the fact that, in 
some domains, our faith in markets has created harms that other disciplines may 
lead us to fix. Behavioral thinkers have made economics more human.66 Posner’s 
own thinking on behavioral economics appears to be evolving. Twenty years ago, 
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Judge Posner criticized the Jolls, Thaler, and Sunstein paper as a collection of 
“cognitive quirks.”67 He said they have no “theory to set against rational-choice 
theory.”68 Interestingly, Posner’s own anchor on the subject appears to be shape 
shifting. In his newest book, Divergent Paths, Judge Posner revisits the validity of 
behavioral economics and now admits that, like economic analysis of law, 
behavioral economics has some validity.69 Judge Posner’s past thinking on contract 
law should be read with that concession in mind. 
 
67.  See Posner, supra note 2, at 1558. 
68.  See id. 
69.   POSNER, supra note 5, at 33. 
